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RICO CONSPIRACY: THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT DISTINGUISHES ITSELF 
FROM THE RISING COSTS OF 
GUILTY THOUGHTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In July of 2002, minority partners of the Montreal Expos 
filed charges against Major League Baseball commissioner Bud 
Selig.! The suit seeks $100 million in punitive damages and 
unspecified compensatory damages. 2 Surprising to most, the 
suit is not based on claims arising from disputes over labor, 
salary caps or rules and regulations. Rather, the plaintiffs 
claim that Selig and his co-defendants actively plotted to 
eliminate baseball in Montreal. Their cause of action is based 
on the Racketeering and Corrupt Organization Act. 
The Racketeering and Corrupt Organization Act, 
commonly referred to by its acronym, RICO, was enacted over 
thirty years ago, in 1970.3 The statute is part of the Organized 
Crime Control Act, which, as the title suggests, sought "the 
eradication of organized crime in the United States."4 While 
the Organized Crime Control Act created RICO to "combat the 
infiltration into and corruption of America's legitimate 
business community by organized crime," it is only occasionally 
put to these ends in civil cases today.5 In fact, despite its 
legislative intent, "RICO has become one of the most free-
1 BMO Nesbitt Burns et al. v. Loria et al., No. 1:02cv22061 (S.D. Fla. Filed July 16, 
2002), available at http://news.fmdlaw.comlhdocs/docs/sports!bmoexpos71602cmp.pdf. 
2 Id. 
3 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). 
4 GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CML RICO: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE 3 (American Bar 
Association) (2000). 
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wielding clubs of our time."6 As a result, RICO suits like that 
against Selig are increasingly common. For this reason, some 
commentators have concluded that RICO "is very possibly the 
single worst piece of legislation on the books."7 
Part I of this Comment briefly surveys the legislative 
development of the RICO statute.S It discusses the elements of 
a RICO cause of action and disputes that have arisen among 
the circuit courts over its interpretation.9 Part II of this 
Comment examines the development of civil liability for 
conspiring to participate in a RICO enterprise.1° It focuses on 
cases that have significantly shaped civil RICO conspiracy 
liability throughout the circuit courts. Part III explores the 
split that has developed among the circuits over the definition 
of RICO conspiracy liability, specifically, the difference 
between the Ninth Circuit's definition and that of the 
majority.ll This discussion also considers the Congressional 
intent that shaped the RICO statute, policy aims of the statute 
and implications arising from the different standards of 
liability. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The RICO statute can be found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.12 
Section 1964{c) of the statute creates the civil RICO cause of 
action, which states, in pertinent part, "Any person injured in 
his business or property by reason of a violation of § 1962 ... 
may sue therefore . . . and shall recover threefold the damages 
he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee ... "13 This single sentence has led to a flood of 
litigation. 14 Originally, the statute limited civil remedies to 
6 Lawrence Morahan, Use of Racketeer Statute to Sue Catholic Church Draws Fire, 
CNSNews.com at 
http://www.cnsnews.comlNationlArchive/200203INAT20020325b.html 
7 Second Thoughts on RICO, WALL ST. J., REVIEW & OUTLOOK (Editorial), May 19, 
1989. 
B See infra notes 12-35 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 12-35 and accompanying text. 
to See infra notes 36-128 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 129-150 and accompanying text. 
12 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § I, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). 
13 Gregory P. Joseph, Civil Rico Conspiracy, available at 
http://www.josephnyc.com/article_11.htm. 
14 JOSEPH, supra note 4, at 1. 
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injunctive actions brought by the United States. Just before 
the statute's enactment, however, Congress added a civil 
remedy not confined to governmental plaintiffs.15 As a result, 
RICO has become a formidable weapon for plaintiffs in civil 
litigation.16 
One primary factor driving RICO suits is the lucrative 
damages it awards. Although the original RICO bill that 
passed the Senate did not include treble damages to those 
injured by racketeering activities, this clause was added to give 
those "wronged by organized crime access to a legal remedy."17 
The bill's Senate sponsor stated that the treble damages would 
be "a major new tool in extirpating the baneful influence of 
organized crime in our economic life."18 Another factor 
contributing to the increase of RICO suits is the broad 
language of the statute. Even though the bill's express purpose 
was to wipe out organized crime in the United States, the 
statute does not specifically identify organized crime as a 
target. This is partly due to the difficulty of defining organized 
crime and, partly, because of the belief that requiring proof 
that a defendant falls within such a definition would thwart 
efforts to achieve the remedial objectives of the law.19 
Accordingly, the legislature drafted the statute in general 
terms to allow for flexible application. 20 
RICO suits have also increased because of broader 
interpretations of liability under the statute. During the past 
decade, several important holdings have lowered the threshold 
that successful plaintiffs must meet. Consequently, the use of 
RICO has spread to a range of scenarios well beyond organized 
crime. 
A ELEMENTS OF A RICO CAUSE OF ACTION 
Typically, civil liability resulting from a substantive 
violation of RICO requires the defendant to engage in a 
"pattern of racketeering activity." "Racketeering activity" is 
15 Id. at 2·3. 
16 Frederick B. Lacey, Civil RICO Update, SE99 ALI·ABA 301, at 304 (2000). 
17 William H. Rehnquist, Get RICO Out of My Courtroom, WALL ST. J., May 19, 
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defined as the commission of any number of state and federal 
offenses enumerated in Section 1961(1), such as: mail fraud, 
wire fraud, drug trafficking, murder, arson, gambling, bribery, 
extortion, or embezzlement.21 At least one of these offenses 
must be committed through a pattern to sustain a RICO claim. 
These acts are called "predicate acts" of racketeering.22 A 
"pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two related 
acts of racketeering activity within a ten-year period.23 
A showing of racketeering activity alone, however, will not 
support a plaintiffs suit. A civil RICO plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the defendant committed the racketeering 
activity in connection with the affairs of an "enterprise" 
engaged in or affecting interstate commerce in a manner that 
violates one of the four subsections of Section 1962.24 An 
"enterprise" is any individual, partnership, corporation, 
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of 
individuals associated-in-fact, although not a legal entity.25 
Traditionally, the enterprise requirement is broadly 
interpreted and requires a common purpose and "some 
structure ... but there need not be much."26 
There are three substantive violations and one conspiracy 
violation under RICO.27 Accordingly, a person can violate 
RICO by: 
(1) Investment: Under Section 1962(a), it is unlawful to 
invest any income derived from a pattern of racketeering 
activity (or through collection of an unlawful debt) to acquire 
any interest in, or to establish or operate, any enterprise that is 
engaged in or affects interstate of foreign commerce. 
(2) . Acquisition: Under Section 1962(b), it is unlawful to 
acquire or maintain any interest in, or control of, any 
enterprise that is engaged or in or affects interstate or foreign 
commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity or 
collection of an unlawful debt. 
21 Lacey, supra note 12, at 304 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962). 
22 Id. at 304. 
23 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(5». 
24 Id. at 304. 
25 Id. at 305 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1961(4». 
26 Id. at 305 (quoting Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1379 (7th Cir. 1992». 
27 Id. at 304. 
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(3) Participation: Under Section 1962(c), it is unlawful for 
any person to conduct or participate in the conduct of the 
affairs of an enterprise that is engaged in or affects interstate 
or foreign commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity 
or· collection of an unlawful debt.28 
The fourth type of violation under RICO Section 1962 is 
conspiracy to commit a substantive RICO offense.29 
Consequently, one violates the RICO statute when he conspires 
to commit a substantive RICO offense.3o 
B. INTERPRETIVE DISPUTES AMONG THE CIRCUITS 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed several 
issues that have grown out of disputes over interpretive 
differences of the RICO statute, although only a handful of 
these issues were addressed in the first years after RICO's 
enactment. In fact, for years after its enactment, civil RICO 
had little effect on organized crime or racketeering within 
organizations because few civil suits were filed. 31 Then, in the 
1980's, the number of civil suits filed under the statute 
flourished because of coverage afforded to civil RICO actions by 
the national media, legal publications and continuing legal 
education programs. 32 Private plaintiffs awoke to the lucrative 
treble damages available under civil RICO and the number of 
civil RICO cases filed in federal courts rapidly multiplied.33 As 
a result, federal courts are burdened with traditional state 
court actions, like divorce, trespass, professional malpractice, 
inheritance disputes, employment benefits, and sexual 
harassment, which have been recast as RICO claims.34 
One area of interpretive dispute that plagues the RICO 
statute, and that places the Ninth Circuit at odds with the 
28 Joseph, supra note 14, at 1·2. 
29 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). 
30 Yvette M. Mastin, RICO Conspiracy: Dismantles the Mexican Mafia & Disables 
Procedural Due Process, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2295, 2309 (2001), (quoting 18 
U.S.C. 1962(a·d». 
31 Id. at 2312 (quoting Douglas E. Abrams, Crime Legislation and the Public 
Interest: Lessons from Civil RICO, 50 SMU L. REV. 33, 51 (1996». 
32 Id. at 2312 (quoting Robert E. Wood, Civil RICO-Limitations in Limbo, 21 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 683, 684 (1985); William H. Rehnquist, Get RICO Out of My 
Courtroom, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1989, at AI4). 
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majority of circuits, is RICO's "conspiracy" provision, Section 
1962(d). At issue is its interplay with RICO's "participation" 
provision, Section 1962(c). Alleged violations of RICO's 
participation provision are the basis of most civil actions under 
RICO.35 
The split among the circuits regarding a defendant's 
liability for conspiring to participate in a RICO enterprise 
stems from two key issues. The first issue is the level of 
participation a defendant must have in the RICO enterprise. 
The second is what standard of conspiracy governs the civil 
RICO statute, general conspiracy law or civil conspiracy law. 
To better understand the circuits' split over the interpretation 
of liability under RICO's conspiracy section, the next section 
reviews pertinent decisions that have shaped RICO conspiracy 
law. 
II. CASE HISTORY 
A. THE REVES DECISION 
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court handed down 
its decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young. 36 At issue in Reves was 
whether a defendant must participate in the operation or 
management of the RICO enterprise to be liable under the 
RICO participation provision. The participation provision 
makes it illegal "for any person employed by or associated with 
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, 
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, 
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs 
through a pattern of racketeering activity ... "37 
In this case, the plaintiffs, purchasers of demand notes 
from a farmer's cooperative, brought securities fraud and RICO 
participation actions against the cooperative's accountants.38 
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant accounting firm 
35 Lee Applebaum, Case Law May Open Door for RICO Plaintiffs: Statute Could 
Allow Avoidance of Reves Test, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 15, 2001, available at 
WL 3/15/2001 TLI 5. 
36 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993). 
37 Id. at 172 (quoting U.S.C. §§ 1962(c». 
38 Id. at 176. 
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prepared annual financial audits that knowingly overvalued 
the principal asset of the cooperative.39 
In its analysis, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument 
that the word "conduct" in Section 1962(c) should be read as 
"carryon," stating that if this were the interpretation, then 
"any involvement in the affairs of an enterprise would satisfy 
the 'conduct or participate' requirement."40 Conversely, the 
Court agreed with the defendant and found that the word 
"conduct" requires some degree of direction, and "participate" 
requires some part in that direction.41 Thus, the Court held 
that to conduct, or participate, directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct of an enterprise's affairs, a <;lefendant must participate 
in the operation or management of the enterprise.42 Therefore, 
"[a] person cannot be liable under section 1962(c) unless he or 
she participated in the operation or management of the alleged 
RICO enterprise."43 This standard of liability is commonly 
referred to as the Reves "operation or management" test.44 
Based on this reasoning, the Court found that the defendant's 
actions in Reves - preparing the cooperative's financial 
statements - did not give rise to liability under the 
participation provision.45 
B. THE ANTAR DECISION 
Although Reves clarified the level of participation a 
defendant must embrace in a RICO enterprise to be liable for 
violating the RICO participation provision, its holding defined 
the initial contours of a split between the federal courts over 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 179. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 185 
43 Id at 176. In deciding Reves, the Court relied on the "operation or management 
test" articulated in Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364. In that case, former and 
present residents of a retirement community alleged that the defendants participated, 
and conspired to participate, in a pattern of racketeering through mail fraud. In 
reviewing the plaintiffs complaint, the court stated that mere participation in the 
predicate offenses listed in RICO, even in conjunction with a RICO enterprise, may be 
insufficient to support a RICO cause of action. Rather, a defendant's participation 
must be in the conduct of the affairs of a RICO enterprise, which ordinarily will require 
some participation in the operation or management of the enterprise itself. 
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the applicability of its operation or management test with 
regard to the RICO conspiracy provision. 
In 1995, the Third Circuit faced two criminal defendants 
charged with conspiring to participate in a RICO enterprise, 
based on predicate acts of securities fraud, mail fraud and 
falsification of financial statements.46 In United States v. 
Antar, one defendant argued that since he "opted-out" of the 
conspiracy some five years prior to the RICO conspiracy 
charge, he could not be guilty of violating the participation 
provision under the Reves operation or management test. 47 In 
addition, he claimed that since he could not be guilty of 
violating the participation provision, he could not alternatively 
be guilty for conspiring to violate that same provision.48 The 
defendant asserted that "courts risk eviscerating Reves by 
blanketly approving conspiracy convictions when substantive 
convictions under section 1962(c) are unavailable."49 Indeed, 
one commentator remarked that "if Congress' restriction of 
section 1962(c) liability to those who operate or manage the 
enterprise can be avoided simply by alleging that a defendant 
aided and abetted or conspired with someone who operated or 
managed the enterprise, then Reves would be rendered almost 
nugatory."50 
While the Antar court acknowledged that this argument 
could have merit if Reves were interpreted broadly, it crafted a 
distinction: 
[W]e believe that a distinction can be drawn between, on the 
one hand, conspiring to operate or manage an enterprise, and, 
on the other, conspiring with someone who is operating or 
managing the enterprise. Liability would be permissible 
under the first scenario, but, without more, not under the 
second. 51 
The court reasoned that in the first scenario, the defendant 
is conspiring to do something for which, if successful, he would 
46 United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 572 (3rd Cir. 1995). 
47 Id. at 580. 
48 Id. 
49 Id at 581. 
50 Id., quoting David B. Smith & Terrance G. Reed, Civil RICO, § 5.04 at 5·39 
(1994). 
51 Antar, 53 F.3d at 581. 
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be liable under the substantive participation provision; 
whereas in the second, the defendant is not conspiring to do 
something for which he could be liable under that same 
substantive provision. 52 Therefore, the court held that 
conspiracy liability cannot stand unless a defendant conspires 
to operate or manage a RICO enterprise.53 Aside from this 
reasoning, the court found that Reves and its policies did not 
conflict with the conspiracy charge because the defendant in 
Antar did not properly withdraw from the conspiracy. Thus, 
the court refused to dismiss the conspiracy charge.54 
Effectively, this holding mapped the participation 
requirements of Section 1962(c) onto Section 1962(d). It 
required that a RICO plaintiff establish all of the participation 
elements to make a claim for conspiring to participate in a 
RICO enterprise.55 This holding is based on the reasoning that 
it would not make sense to exclude a class of people from a 
participation violation, only to make those same people liable 
for conspiring to violate that section. 56 The court did not want 
RICO's conspiracy section to find a person liable for conspiring 
to commit an act that was impossible for that person to 
substantively commit. 57 The Antar court wanted to ensure that 
defendants were not held liable for substantive RICO violations 
through the statute's back-door conspiracy provision when 
substantive-provision violations could not be proven; thus, the 
court sought to close the door that Reves left open. As a result, 
the Antar holding left the Third Circuit at odds with the 
Eleventh, Second, Seventh -- and later on the Fifth -- Circuits, 
which hold that the Reves operation or management test does 
not apply to Section 1962(d) convictions. 58 In these circuits, 
judicial interpretation concludes that since Reves did not 
specifically address Section 1962(d), it has no influence over 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 58l. 
55 Applebaum, supra note 35. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Neibel v. Transworld Assurance Co., 108 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing 
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conspiracy claims, even if the conspiracy is to violate Section 
1962(c).59 
C. THE NEIBEL DECISION 
In March of 1997, the Ninth Circuit recognized the existing 
split between the circuits regarding whether the Reves 
operation or management test applies to Section 1962(d) claims 
based on allegations of conspiracy to violate RICO's 
participation provision. It chose to follow the Third Circuit's 
holding in Antar, concluding that the Reves test applies to 
conspiracy claims where the object of the conspiracy is to 
violate RICO through participating in a RICO enterprise.60 
In Neibel v. Transworld Assurance Company, the 
defendant insurance company appealed a district court 
judgment where it was found liable for conspiracy under 
RICO.61 In this case, the defendant argued that there was 
insufficient evidence for the jury to find that it violated Section 
1962(d).62 The appellate court, finding that "the Third Circuit's 
opinion in Antar best comports with our post-Reves case law," 
held that in order to "participate, directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct of such enterprise's affairs," one must have some part 
in directing those affairs.63 Concluding that the jury properly 
found the defendant's activities supported an agreement to 
have sqme part in directing the enterprise's affairs, the court 
held that the plaintiffs' conspiracy claim was valid.64 
The defendant in Neibel further argued that the district 
court's directed verdict on the RICO participation claim 
prevented the plaintiffs from succeeding on the conspiracy 
claim.65 The appellate court found, however, that the 
defendant inaccurately relied on an interpretation of an earlier 
Ninth Circuit case in its argument.66 In that earlier case, 
Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, the court held that 
since the plaintiff "failed to allege the requisite substantive 
59 JOSEPH, supra note 4, at 127. 
60 Westways World Travel v. AMR Corp, 182 F. Supp. 2d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2001). 
61 Neibel, 108 F.3d at 1122. 
62 Id. at 1128. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1129. 
65 Id. at 1127. 
6Il Id. at 1128. 
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elements of RICO, the conspiracy cause of action cannot 
stand."67 The Neibel court specified that what the court meant 
in Wollersheim was that if the participation claim does not 
state a cause of action upon which relief could ever be granted, 
regardless of evidence, then the conspiracy claim cannot 
stand.68 Clarifying this holding, the court stated that "[a] lack 
of evidence may render the substantive claim deficient, but it 
does not render it legally impossible."69 In such situations, 
therefore, a conspiracy claim may proceed to the jury despite a 
directed verdict on participation claims.70 Consequently, the 
court rejected the defendant's argument.71 
Accordingly, Neibel defines the Ninth Circuit's 
interpretation of conspiracy to violate RICO's participation 
provision as "an agreement to conduct or participate in the 
affairs of an enterprise and an agreement to the commission of 
at least two predicate acts."72 In addition, it graphs the Reves 
operation or management test onto its definition so that there 
must be substantial evidence that the defendant agreed to have 
some part in directing the RICO enterprise.73 
D. THE SALINAS DECISION 
In 1997, the Supreme Court handed down another 
important decision that furthered the conflict among the 
circuit courts regarding RICO conspiracy law. Prior to Salinas 
v. United States, the circuits were split as to whether the 
agreement to commit the predicate acts must be an agreement 
on the part of the defendant personally to commit two acts of 
racketeering activity.74 In this criminal case, the plaintiff was 
charged with participation and conspiracy violations.75 At 
trial, a jury acquitted the defendant of the participation count 
67 Neibel, 108 F.3d at 1127 (citing Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 971 





72 [d. at 1128 (citing Baumer v. Pachl, 8 F.3d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1993), (quoting 
United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 499 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
939,940). 
73 [d at 1128. 
74 Salinas v. United States, 52 U.S. 61 (1997). 
75 [d. at 55 
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because he had not personally committed that Section's 
requisite minimum two predicate acts, but it convicted him of 
the conspiracy count.76 The Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's decision and reasoned that even if the plaintiff did not 
accept or agree to commit the predicate acts (in this case, 
accepting bribes) personally, there was ample evidence that his 
co-conspirator committed at least two predicate acts and that 
the plaintiff knew about and agreed to facilitate the scheme.77 
The Supreme Court concluded that such knowledge and intent 
is sufficient to support the defendant's conspiracy conviction.78 
Accordingly, the Court held that a defendant need not 
personally commit two predicate acts to be liable for 
conspiracy.79 It asserted that general conspiracy law governs 
Section 1962(d) and consequently, a conspiracy may exist even 
if a conspirator does not agree to commit or facilitate each 
substantive offense.8o Therefore, conspirators are liable for the 
acts of their co-conspirators when each agrees to pursue the 
same criminal objective.81 
While the Salinas holding resolved the conflict among the 
circuits regarding whether a defendant must personally 
commit two predicate acts to be liable for RICO conspiracy, its 
broad wording furthered the confusion among the circuits 
concerning the standard to use in determining conspiracy 
liability under RICO. In its holding, the Salinas court said to 
be liable for conspiring to participate in a RICO enterprise, "a 
conspirator must intend to further an endeavor which, if 
completed, would satisfy all of the elements a substantive 
offense, but it suffices that he adopt the goal of furthering or 
facilitating the criminal endeavor."82 In consequence, a 
conspirator may violate RICO's participation provision in any 
number of ways short of agreeing to undertake all of the acts 
necessary for the crime's completion.83 Moreover, the Court 
explained that, "[a] person may be liable for conspiracy even 
though he was incapable of committing the substantive 
76 Id at 63. 
77 Id. at 66. 
78 Id. 
79 Id at 65. 
80 Id at 63. 
8! Id. 
82 Id at 65. 
83 Id. 
12
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offence."84 Therefore, conspiracy liability may attach without 
the need to prove that a defendant committed an overt act. 
Since this 1997 verdict, federal courts have continually 
struggled with Salinas and its application to civil RICO 
conspiracy claims.85 The resulting decisions are perplexing and 
uncertain.86 The holding has strained the circuits' attempts to 
reconcile the scope of Reves operation or management test, that 
test's applicability to Section 1962(d) and the level of 
knowledge and participation an alleged conspirator must 
embrace. What specifically, then, is required to conspire to 
violate the substantive provisions of the RICO statute? The 
Supreme Court has yet to address this question. 
E. THE BROUWER DECISION 
In January of 2000, "at the risk of splitting hairs that are 
already split," the Seventh Circuit sought to reconcile Salinas 
and Reves and explain whether a party must agree to 
personally participate in the operation, management, or 
conduct of the RICO enterprise for a conspiracy violation to 
exist under Section 1962(d).B7 In Brouwer v. Raffensperger, the 
plaintiffs alleged that both an underwriting firm and a law 
firm conspired to violate the RICO statute through a Ponzi 
scheme created to raise capital and simultaneously conceal the 
undercapitalized condition of the bankrupt issuer.88 The 
plaintiffs argued that pursuant to Salinas, the general law of 
conspiracy applies to Section 1962(d) and, therefore, it is wrong 
to require personal participation in the conduct of the affairs of 
the RICO enterprise.89 Based on this reasoning, the plaintiffs 
also argued that, under a RICO conspiracy claim, if it is 
sufficient that a conspirator agree that someone else commit 
the predicate acts, then it should also be sufficient that a 
84 Id. at 64. 
85 Dean Browning Webb & John Clinton Geil, Judicial Implausability: Beck 
Severely Restricts Salinas in Civil RICO Conspiracy Litigation, 16 No. 10 Andrews Civ. 
RICO Litig. Rep. 13 (June 2000), available at WL 16 No. 10 ANCRLR 13. 
86 Id. 
87 Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co, 199 f.3d 961, 967 (7th Cir. 2000). The 
court's full statement says: At the risk of splitting hairs that are already split, we will 
attempt to make sense out of all of this, reconcile Salinas and Reves, and explain the 
kind of personal participation we hold is necessary to violate subsection (d). Id. at 967. 
88 Id. at 963. 
89 Id. at 964. 
13
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conspirator agree that someone else should conduct the affairs 
of the RICO enterprise.90 
In considering the plaintiffs' arguments, the appellate 
court acknowledged that it has consistently required some 
degree of personal participation for a defendant to be liable for 
conspiring to violate the participation provision.91 Rather than 
abandon this principle of personal participation, and rather 
than adhere to the higher standard of participation spelled out 
by the Supreme Court in Reves, the Seventh Circuit 
compromised. It held that "one does not need to agree 
personally to be an operator or manager. One must knowingly 
agree to perform services of a kind which facilitate the 
activities of those who are operating the enterprise in an illegal 
manner."92 The Brouwer court found that it is an agreement, 
not to operate or manage the enterprise, but to facilitate 
personally the activities of those who do that stipulates liability 
for RICO conspiracy.93 
Agreeing with the plaintiffs that, per Salinas, general 
conspiracy law applies to Section 1962(d), the court found that 
it is not necessary that a defendant personally participate in 
the operation or management of the enterprise. 94 The court 
cautioned, however, "this is not a bright line, that district 
judges will have to evaluate whether what a defendant agreed 
to do is sufficient to bring his conduct within subsection (d)."95 
In their writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, petitioners 
argued that the application of the Reves operation and 
management test to RICO conspiracy claims is a recurring 
issue on which the circuits are in conflict.96 The Supreme 
Court, however, declined to review this ruling.97 
90 Id. 
9! Id. at 965. 
92 Id. at 967. 
93 Id . . at 967. 
94 Id. at 965·67. 
95 Id. at 967. 
96 Supreme Court Denies Review of RICO Conspiracy Ruling, 16 No. 10 Andrews 
Civ. RICO Litig. Rep.3 (June 2000), available at WL 16 No. 10 ANCRLR 3. 
97 Brouwer, 530 U.S. 1243 (2000), cert. denied. 
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F. THE BECK DECISION 
Three years after Salinas and four months after the 
Seventh Circuit's decision in Brouwer, the Supreme Court 
again sought to resolve a split between the circuits regarding 
the interpretation of civil RICO. In Beck v. Prupis, the 
Supreme Court decided the issue of whether a person injured 
by an overt act done in furtherance of a RICO conspiracy has a 
cause of action if the overt act is not an act of racketeering.98 
Beck is a whistle-blower case that involved a chief 
executive officer who was terminated after alerting regulators 
to the activities of his colleagues. He asserted that the 
company's officers and directors were engaged in racketeering 
activity and orchestrated his removal to further their illegal 
activities. 99 The defendants argued that employees who are 
terminated for refusing to participate in RICO activities, or 
who threaten to report RICO activities, do not have standing to 
sue under RICO for damages from their loss of employment. lOO 
The district court and the court of appeals agreed with the 
defendants' argument and the Supreme Court affirmed both 
lower courts' holdings. The Supreme Court concluded that 
relief arising from a RICO conspiracy' claim must be 
proximately attributable to the commission of an overt act 
specifically identified by the RICO statute. l01 Any overt act not 
statutorily listed under RICO precludes the required standing 
to advance such a claim.l02 
In its analysis, the Supreme Court relied on the effect of 
combining Sections 1964(c) and 1962(d) of RICO, so that 
together the provisions provide a civil cause of action for 
conspiracy. 103 Where Section 1964(c) creates a cause of action 
available to anyone "injured ... by reason of a violation of 
section 1962," Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful for a person 
"to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), 
(b), or (c) of this section."!04 "To define what it means to be 
98 Beck v. Pupis, 529 U.S. 494, 496 (2000). 
99 Id. at 498-99. 
100 Id. at 499. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 505. 
103 Id. at 500 n.6. 
104 [d. at 500. 
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injured ... by reason of a conspiracy," the Supreme Court relied 
on the common law definition of civil conspiracy.105 
In Beck, the Supreme Court looked to numerous holdings 
to support its finding and concluded, that: 
[t]here is no civil action for conspiracy alone. It must be 
coupled with the commission of acts that damaged the 
plaintiff. Recovery may be had from parties on the theory of 
concerted action as long as the elements of the separate and 
actionable tort are properly proved. lOG 
The Court further stated the principle that "a civil 
conspiracy plaintiff must claim injury from an act of a tortious 
character was so widely accepted at the time of RICO's 
adoption as to be incorporated in the common understanding of 
civil conspiracy."I07 Thus, it concluded, Congress must have 
intended the cause of action to rest on the common law 
principles of civil conspiracy.108 
Therefore, while the Beck decision clarifies that a civil 
plaintiff does not have standing under RICO for an Injury 
caused by a non-racketeering act, it fuels the confusion 
regarding the interpretation of RICO's conspiracy provision. 
Some practitioners argue that this holding is at direct odds 
with the Supreme Court's previous holding in Salinas.109 
There, the Court concluded that general conspiracy law 
governs Section 1962(d) and that an overt act is not necessary 
for a RICO conspiracy conviction, rather, it is only necessary to 
show that a conspirator intended to facilitate or further the 
criminal endeavor.l1o Although Salinas is a criminal RICO 
case and Beck is a civil suit, the Beck Court notes in Beck that 
Salinas neither repudiates its holding regarding what 
constitutes a conspiracy violation nor indicates that the 
violation is different in a civil context.l l1 How then, can Beck 
be reconciled with Salinas? The Third Circuit circumvented 
this question in Smith u. Berg. 112 
105 Id. at 50l. 
106 Id. at 1615 (citing Halbertstam v. Welsch, 705 F.2d 472 (C.A.D.C. 1983». 
107 Id. at 504. 
108 Id. 
109 Supreme Court Denies Review of RICO Conspiracy Ruling, supra note 97. 
110 Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63. 
111 Beck, 529 U.S. at 500 n.6. 
112 Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532 (3rd Cir. 2001). 
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G. THE SMITH DECISION 
The same circuit that authored the Antar holding in 1995 
again faced the issue of civil RICO conspiracy liability in July 
of 2000. On the heels of the Supreme Court's decision in Beck, 
a Third Circuit district court issued its holding in Smith u. 
Berg and immediately certified its holding for appeal. l13 In 
April of 2001, a three-judge federal appeals panel unanimously 
affirmed the district court's holding.114 
In Smith, the plaintiffs alleged. that one of the defendants, 
John G. Berg, misled them into purchasing homes they could 
not afford through fraudulent assertions.l15 The plaintiffs 
further alleged that the other defendants, title insurance and 
lending companies, conspired with Berg to further his 
fraudulent enterprise by allowing him to assume many of his 
co-defendants' normal functions during the course of the 
transactions.l16 The defendants, on the other hand, argued 
that the plaintiffs' claims failed because the defendants' 
conduct did not demonstrate that they managed or operated, or 
agreed to manage or operate, Berg's enterprise and therefore, 
they did not violate the RICO participation provision.117 The 
defendants based this argument on the Third Circuit's earlier 
ruling in Antar, where it found that a defendant must conspire 
to operate or manage a RICO enterprise to be liable under 
Section 1962(d).118 The court rejected the defendants' 
argument in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Salinas. 
In short, the court found that Salinas "implicitly overruled 
our prior holding in United States u. Antar, and that, in 
accordance with Salinas, liability under Section 1962(d) is met 
by knowledge of the corrupt enterprise's activities and 
agreement to facilitate those activities."l19 It held that a 
defendant need not operate or manage a RICO enterprise to be 
liable under Section 1962(d).120 The court further stated that 
the distinction it crafted in Antar between conspiring to 
113 Id. at 536. 
11. Id. at 539. 
115 Id. at 534. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 539. 
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operate or manage an enterprise versus conspiring with 
someone who operates or manages the enterprise, was likewise 
unnecessary to the Antar holding because in that case, the 
defendant met both standards.121 
Furthermore, the court noted that the majority of other 
circuits have not applied the Reves operation or management 
test to RICO conspiracy claims. It agreed with the majority of 
circuits that Reves addressed only the extent of conduct or 
participation necessary to violate the participation provision of 
the statute and that it did not address the principles of 
conspiracy law comprising Section 1962(d).122 
Therefore, the Third Circuit reconsidered the standard of 
conspiracy liability it crafted in Antar and held that "any 
reading of Antar suggesting a stricter standard of liability 
under section 1962(d) is inconsistent with the broad application 
of general conspi~acy law set forth in Salinas."123 It stated that 
pursuant to general conspiracy law, a defendant may be held 
liable for conspiracy to violate the participation provision if he 
knowingly agrees to facilitate a scheme that includes the 
operation or management of a RICO enterprise.124 
Accordingly, the Smith court interpreted Salinas as 
broadening the scope of RICO conspiracy and implicitly 
rejected the limits it suggested earlier in Antar.125 "The plain 
implication of the standard set forth in Salinas is that one who 
opts into or participates in a conspiracy is liable for the acts of 
his coconspirators which violate the participation prOVlSIOn 
even if the defendant did not personally agree to do, or to 
conspire with respect to, any particular element."126 
Taking into consideration the impact of Beck on the issues 
in Smith, the district court concluded, "Beck did not affect the 
plaintiffs' claims in this case because they, unlike Beck, allege 
direct injury as a result of the racketeering."127 Utilizing this 
121 Id. at 536. 
122 Id. (quoting United States v. Quintalnilla, 2 F.3d 1469, 1484-85 (7th Cir. 1993». 
123 Smith, 247 F.3d at 538. 
124 Id. 
125 Shannon P. Duffy, Narrowing Antar, :Jrd Circuit Broadens Who Can Be 
'Conspirator' in Rico Suit, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 18, 2001, available at WL 
4/18/2001 TLI 1. 
126 Id. 
127 Smith, 247 F.3d at 536. 
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distinction, the Third Circuit avoided the issue of reconciling 
the Beck and Salinas decisions. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Despite these Supreme Court and circuit court decisions, 
questions surrounding what is required to conspire to violate 
the RICO participation provision still linger. Specifically, the 
issues of whether conspiracy liability requires a defendant to 
conspire to operate or manage the RICO enterprise and 
whether that same liability requires an overt act in furtherance 
of the conspiracy remain. 
Current Ninth Circuit law mandates that to be civilly 
liable for conspiring to violate the RICO participation 
provision, a defendant must (1) agree to participate in the 
affairs of the RICO enterprise; (2) agree to the commission of at 
least two predicates acts; and (3) participate in the operation or 
management of the enterprise.128 This interpretation of the 
statute conflicts with the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh 129 
and after Smith, the Third130 Circuits' interpretation of the 
statute. The split stems from interpretive differences between 
the circuits' readings of Salinas in relation to Reves and 
Salinas in relation to Beck. 
A. APPLICABILITY OF THE REVES OPERATION OR MANAGEMENT 
TEST 
The Ninth Circuit requires a RICO plaintiff to show 
substantial evidence indicating that a defendant of a RICO 
conspiracy suit operated or managed (or agreed to operate or 
manage) a RICO enterprise. Otherwise, as the Seventh Circuit 
aptly states in Brouwer, "it seems wrong that a person could 
conspire to violate a law which does not apply to him."131 Yet, 
this is exactly what the Seventh and other circuits permit by 
not requiring that conspiracy defendants meet the Reves 
operation or management test. 
128 Westways World Travel, v. AMR Corp., 182 F.Supp.2d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2001). 
129 Baker v. Stewart Title & Trust of Phoenix, Inc., 5 P.3d 249,258 n. 6 (2000). 
130 Smith, 247 F.3d at 539. 
131 Brouwer, 199 F.3d at 966. 
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In particular, the Third and Seventh Circuits rely on the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Salinas as grounds for not 
mandating defendants charged with conspiring to violate the 
participation provision to have operated or managed the RICO 
enterprise. This reliance, however, is misplaced. In Smith and 
Brouwer, Third and Seventh Circuit cases respectively, the 
courts reject the premise that the Reves operation or 
management test applies not only to Section 1962(c) of RICO, 
but also to Section 1962(d). 
In Smith, the court reasons that because the Salinas court 
expresses its analysis of RICO's conspiracy section in broad 
terms, that "any reading of Antar suggesting a stricter 
standard of liability under section 1962(d) is inconsistent .. 
. "132 Thus, the Smith court concludes that "[i]n accord with the 
general principles of criminal conspiracy law, a defendant may 
be held liable for conspiracy to violate section 1962(c) if he 
knowingly agrees to facilitate ... a RICO enterprise."133 
In Brouwer, the court correctly concludes that Reves holds 
defendants liable under Section 1962(c) when they participate 
in the conduct of the enterprise through a pattern of 
racketeering activity.134 Based on this conclusion, it crafts a 
special relationship between the RICO enterprise and the 
conspiracy to run it. 135 The court postulates that an agreement 
to join a conspiracy is highly personal and similarly, an 
agreement to participate in the conduct of an enterprise is 
personal. But, it concludes, actually getting the job done is not 
necessarily personal.136 For that reason, the Brouwer court 
interprets the Salinas holding as requiring an analysis of the 
"level of personal participation" the defendant shared in the 
enterprise rather than whether the defendant participated in 
its operation or management.137 
Both of these courts' decisions are misguided in as much as 
they strive to reconcile the Supreme Court's holding in Salinas 
with Reves. In these two cases, the courts were determining 
the liability of defendants, who, like the defendant in Reves, 
132 Smith, 247 F.3d at 538. 
133 Id. at 538. 
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were "outside" of the enterprise. That is, these defendants 
were not "employed by or associated with" the RICO enterprise 
and accordingly, they did not meet the operation or 
management test. 138 
At issue in Salinas, contrary to Reves, is the liability of a 
defendant "inside" of the RICO enterprise. In Salinas, the 
court properly held that an "insider" defendant, whose actions 
are essential to the success of the enterprise, and who 
knowingly implements decisions of the enterprise's 
management and thus enables the enterprise to achieve its 
goals, can be found liable under RICO's conspiracy section 
independent of the Reves operation or management test. 
Salinas, in fact, portrays a typical scenario of organized crime 
that the statute aims to combat. The Supreme Court's 
unanimous opinion that the defendant in Salinas was guilty of 
conspiring to violate RICO supports this contention. 
It is, therefore, the inherent differences between Reves and 
Salinas, the former being a civil action concerning "outsider" 
liability and the latter a criminal case dealing with a 
racketeering enterprise "insider," that run afoul the circuit 
courts' attempts to reconcile them. The result of these 
attempts is an overly-broad interpretation of the RICO 
conspiracy provision that does not support the intent of the 
statute or the policy it reflects. 
In Reves, the Supreme Court defined the intent of the 
RICO participation provision as a means to find liability in 
defendants who conduct or participate in a RICO enterprise's 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.139 There, the 
Court concluded that this section is properly interpreted to 
mean that only defendants who operate or manage the 
enterprise can be liable for violating it.140 To make this point, 
the Court distinguishes the conspiracy provision from Sections 
1962(a) and (b), the investment and acquisition provisions. 
The Court maintains that these provisions were constructed 
specifically to address the liability attributable to defendants 
138 See Reves, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993). The Court holds that to be "associated with" 
a RICO enterprise, a defendant must participate in the operation or management of 
that enterprise. Id. at 185. 
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"outsider" of the enterprise.141 Section 1962(d), on the other 
hand, was targeted specifically at defendants operating within 
the organization.142 
Consequently, if a defendant of a conspiracy to participate 
in a RICO enterprise is not held to the same standard as a 
defendant accused of participating in a racketeering enterprise, 
then the Court's holding in Reves would be meaningless. Thus, 
even though the Supreme Court has not modified or reversed 
Reves, the majority's interpretation of Section 1962(d) 
effectively eviscerates it and allows every failed participation 
claim to be recast as a conspiracy claim. The Ninth Circuit 
does not. Accordingly, its interpretation concurs with the 
Supreme Court's. 
B. NECESSITY OF AN OVERT ACT 
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Salinas, 
several circuit courts relaxed their standards of liability in 
claims for conspiring to violate RICO through racketeering 
activity. Not only did the majority of circuits disregard the 
application of the Reves operation or management test to 
conspiracy claims, but they also abandoned the civil conspiracy 
law principle that a conspirator agree to commit, or agree that 
another conspirator should commit, an overt act in furtherance 
of the conspiracy. Instead, these circuits merely require that 
conspirators share a common purpose. 
In Smith, the Third Circuit analyzed the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Salinas and determined that for conspiracy liability 
to attach, it is only necessary that defendant conspirators 
knowingly agree to facilitate the RICO enterprise.143 Although 
the district court in Smith requested briefing from the parties 
on the import of the Supreme Court's decision in Beck, it 
concluded that Beck did not affect the plaintiffs claims because 
the Smith plaintiffs, unlike the Beck plaintiff, alleged direct 
injury as a result of racketeering.144 The Smith appellate court 
also concluded that the Beck holding did not vitiate the Smith 
plaintiffs' claims because it found that Beck did not alter the 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Smith, 247 F.3d at 537. 
144 Id. at 536. 
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standard for determining liability under RICO's conspiracy 
section that the Supreme Court defined in Salinas. 145 In 
considering the significance of Beck in Smith, however, the 
Third Circuit misinterpreted the Supreme Court's reasoning 
and, consequently, it misconstrued the standard to which RICO 
conspiracy defendants should be held. 
In footnote 6 of Beck, the Court plainly states that the 
common law of criminal conspiracy defines what constitutes a 
violation of RICO Section 1962(d) in criminal cases. 146 "We 
have turned to the common law of criminal conspiracy to define 
what constitutes a violation of § 1962(d), see Salinas."147 When 
the issue, however, is what constitutes a civil cause of action 
for private injury by reason of such a violation, the Court says 
"[t]he obvious source in the common law ... is the law of civil 
conspiracy."148 
Using civil conspiracy law to construe the requisite acts of 
a civil RICO conspiracy violation comports with the principles 
of civil law that were widely accepted at the time RICO was 
enacted. Those principles declare that there must be an act of 
tortious character to carry "[t]he mere common plan, design or 
even express agreement ... into execution."149 Further, 
because inchoate crimes are difficult to conceptualize under 
civil law, it follows that a conspiracy cannot be made the 
subject of a civil action without a concomitant tortious act, the 
damage from which a plaintiff can seek damages. Therefore, it 
is appropriate to distinguish between civil and criminal claims. 
Whereas the purpose of a civil claim is to impute liability for a 
specific injury, the purpose of a criminal claim is to redress the 
harm to society that a conspiracy as such represents. 150 The 
more convincing reading of the RICO conspiracy provision, 
then, mandates that an overt act (of racketeering) be 
committed in furtherance of the enterprise. The Ninth Circuit 
enforces this interpretation. 
145 Id. at 538·39. 
146 Beck, 529 U.S. at 501 n.6. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 [d. at 501. 
150 JOSEPH, supra note 4, at 128. 
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CONCLUSION 
Due to recent judicial holdings, the majority of circuit 
courts have allowed the net of liability for conspiring to 
participate in a RICO enterprise to expand. As a result, court 
dockets are becoming increasingly crowded and plaintiffs are 
reworking their traditional state court causes of action so that 
they may enjoy the lucrative returns of a successful RICO 
claim. More disturbing however, is the strong likelihood that 
defendants in these circuits will be found liable under the 
statute "through association" or for "conspiring to conspire." In 
either case, the majority's interpretation of the RICO 
conspiracy provision hands plaintiffs a powerful tool. It 
enables them to infringe upon RICO defendants' First 
Amendment right of freedom of association and lets them 
punish RICO defendants for guilty thoughts. Conversely, the 
Ninth Circuit's reading of RICO guards defendants against 
unjust RICO claims and prevents the statute from being 
employed beyond its intent and purpose. It is this trend, after 
all, that has led practitioners to conclude "RICO is very 
possibly the single worst piece of legislation on the books."151 
Thus, even though the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the 
RICO statute is at odds with the majority of circuits', Supreme 
Court precedent, civil conspiracy law and legislative intent 
each advocate that confining liability to conspiring to operate 
or manage the enterprise makes sense. In conclusion, the 
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of RICO's conspiracy provision is 
the more persuasive. 
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